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EMPLOYEE FIDUCIARY DUTIES: ONE SIZE
DOES NOT FIT ALL
Leslie Larkin Cooney*
This article examines the law surrounding the fiduciary du-
ties owed by non-officer employees to their employers and the
remedies imposed for a breach of those duties. It is the author's
contention that applying the same agency principles to all em-
ployees regardless of their level of power or ability to exercise
discretion or affect the employer's interests generates an un-
called for advantage to the employer.1
Employment law in the United States has evolved from the
English law of master and servant, and agency is defined as the
fiduciary relationship arising when a principal manifests assent
to an agent that the agent will act subject to the principal's con-
trol, on the principal's behalf and the agent consents to act.
2
While agency encompasses a range of circumstances and rela-
tionships, the Restatement of Agency (Third) indicates its ele-
ments are present in the employer-employee relationship.3 "The
common law of agency, however, additionally encompasses the
employment relation, even as to employees whom an employer
has not designated to contract on its behalf or otherwise to inte-
* Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law
Center, Nova Southeastern University.
1 This premise applies only to non-officer employees. Officers and other employees
occupying positions of confidence and trust should be subject to the broad application of
agency's fiduciary duties and applicable remedies for breach.
2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). "Agency is the fiduciary relation-
ship that arises when one person (a "principal") manifests assent to another person (an
"agent") that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act." Id. See Walton
v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 251, 273-74 (Fed. Cl. 2008).
3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006); Deborah A. DeMott, Dis-
loyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2007). 'Thus, agents for purposes of common
law agency include lawyers, real estate brokers, stock brokers, officers of legal entities of
all sorts, and employees." Id. See Eckard Brandes, Inc. v. Riley, 338 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th
Cir. 2003); Judah v. Reiner, 744 A.2d 1037, 1039-40 & n.5 (D.C. 2000). But see Haas v.
Caster, 66 N.W. 2d 878, 880 (Iowa 1954) (noting that an employee is not always an
agent for the employer); Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 144 N.W.2d 303,
315 (Iowa 1966) (stating there is a very fine line between agent and employee).
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ract with parties external to the employer's organization."4
Since agency is a fiduciary relationship, if employees are
agents,5 then all employees have a fiduciary relationship with
their employer.6 As agents of the employers, all employees owe
broad fiduciary duties to their employers. 7 The scope of the du-
ties defined by this relationship is outlined in the Restatement
of Agency (Third).
The Restatement of Agency (Third) expresses a general fi-
duciary standard and separates an agent's duties into duties of
loyalty and duties of performance.8 This general fiduciary stan-
dard requires an employee to act loyally for the employer's bene-
fit in all matters connected with the relationship.9 An agent's
specific duties of loyalty restrict an employee from acquiring
any material benefit from a third party in connection with
transactions conducted or other actions taken on behalf of the
employer or otherwise through the use of the employee's posi-
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006).
5 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992); See Richard J.
Hunter, Jr., An "Insiders" Guide to the Legal Liability of Sports Contest Officials, 15
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 369, 398 (2005).
6 H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 165-66 (1877)
(reprinted in R.H. HELMHOLZ, BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., HISTORICAL WRITINGS IN LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE 18 (W.S. Hein 1981)). Wood's Treatise states:
On the part of the servant, there is an implied obligation to enter the master's
service and serve him diligently and faithfully, to obey all his reasonable
commands, treat him respectfully, conduct himself morally in his master's
family, and to perform the duties incident to his employment honestly, with
ordinary care, and due regard to his master's interest and business.
Id. at 166.
7 Konrad Lee, Anti-Employer Blogging: Employee Breach of the Duty of Loyalty and
the Procedure for Allowing Discovery of a Blogger's Identity Before Service of Process Is
Effected, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH REV. 2, 11 (2006).
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01-8.12 (2006). See Abetter Trucking Co.
v. Arizpe, 113 S.W.3d 503, 510 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).
9 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006). "An agent has a fiduciary duty to
act loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connected with the agency relation-
ship." Id. The duty of loyalty derives from the basic obligation of faithful service found in
English master and servant law and has been a part of our earliest common law. Wil-
liam Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in High
Technology Industries, 17 LAB. LAW. 25, 31 (2001) (citing Robert J. Steinfeld, The Inven-
tion of Free Labor: The Employment Relation in English and American Law and Cul-
ture, 13-50-1870, at 169 (1991)). See Ray Mart Inc. v. Stock Bldg. Supply of Tex. LP, No.
07-50609, 2008 WL 4809471, at *6 (5th Cir. Nov. 5, 2008); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 86, 95 (D.D.C. 2009).
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tion ° and restricts the employee from dealing as an adverse
party or on behalf of one in any transaction connected with the
employment.1' The Restatement of Agency (Third) also obliges
employees to refrain from competing with the employer and
from acting for or assisting competitors.1 2 If, for the employee's
own purposes or the purposes of a third party, an employee uses
the employer's property or communicates confidential informa-
tion, the employee violates an agent's duty of loyalty.' 3 An em-
ployer may consent to conduct that would otherwise be disloyal,
but an employee must act in good faith in obtaining this con-
sent, must disclose all material facts and must otherwise deal
fairly with the employer.' 4 An employee may take actions dur-
10 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (2006). "An agent has a duty not to ac-
quire a material benefit from a third party in connection with transactions conducted or
other actions taken on behalf of the principal or otherwise through the agent's use of the
agent's position." Id. See Abetter, 113 S.W.3d at 510; Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard,
P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 2002).
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.03 (2006). "An agent has a duty not to deal
with the principal as or on behalf of an adverse party in a transaction connected with
the agency relationship." Id. See Abetter, 113 S.W.3d at 510; Johnson, 73 S.W.3d at 200;
Television Events & Mktg. Inc. v. Amcon Distrib. Co., 526 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1126-28 (D.
Haw. 2007).
12 RESTI\TEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04 (2006). "Throughout the duration of the
an agency relationship, an agent has a duty to refrain from competing with the principal
and from taking action on behalf of or otherwise assisting the principal's competitors."
Id. "During that time, an agent may take action, not otherwise wrongful, to prepare for
competition following termination of the agency relationship." Id. See Rash v. J.V. In-
termediate, Ltd., 498 F.3d 1201, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that an employee's
failure to disclose his ownership stake in a subcontractor company hired by the principal
resulted in the violation of the employee's fiduciary duty).
13 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006). "An agent has a duty (1) not to
use property of the principal for the agent's own purposes or those of a third party; and,
(2) not to use or communicate confidential information of the principal for the agent's
own purposes or those of a third party." Id. See Synergetics, Inc. v. Hurst, 477 F.3d 949,
959 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that a former employees' use of confidential trade secret
information to design competitive products violated their duty of loyalty to their former
employers).
14 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (2006).
(1) Conduct by an agent that would otherwise constitute a breach of duty as
stated in §§ 8.01, 8.02, 8.03, 8.04, and 8.05 does not constitute a breach of duty
if the principal consents to the conduct, provided that
(a) in obtaining the principal's consent, the agent
(i) acts in good faith,
(ii) discloses all material facts that the agent knows, has reason to
know, or should know would reasonably affect the principal's judg-
ment unless the principal has manifested that such facts are al-
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ing employment to prepare for competition after termination of
employment, provided such activity is not otherwise wrongful.
15
An employee who acts for more than one employer in a transac-
tion between employers has a duty to act in good faith and deal
fairly with each employer, disclosing to each that the employee
works for the other as well as all other facts that would reason-
ably affect either employer.
16
An agent's duties of performance require an employee to
comply with the express and implied terms of any employment
contract,1 7 comply with all lawful instructions, 8 and act with
ready known by the principal or that the principal does not wish to
know them, and
(iii) otherwise deals fairly with the principal; and
(b) the principal's consent concerns either a specific act or transaction, or
acts or transactions of a specified type that could reasonably be expected
to occur in the ordinary course of the agency relationship.
(2) An agent who acts for more than one principal in a transaction between or
among them has a duty
(a) to deal in good faith with each principal,
(b) to disclose to each principal
(i) the fact that the agent acts for the other principal or principals,
and
(ii) all other facts that the agent knows, has reason to know, or
should know would reasonably affect the principal's judgment unless
the principal has manifested that such facts are already known by
the principal or that the principal does not wish to know them, and
(c) otherwise to deal fairly with each principal.
Id. See United Teachers Assocs., Ins. Co. v. MacKeen & Bailey Inc., 99 F.3d 645, 650
(5th Cir. 1996) (holding that an actuary giving advice, with permission, to a competing
insurance company during negotiations of a purchase of that particular company, which
resulted in the failure of negotiations, violated the actuaries fiduciary duty to the insur-
ance company with which he was contracted).
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04 (2006). See Kopka, Landau & Pinkus v.
Hansen, 874 N.E.2d 1065, 1071-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that an attorney plan-
ning to leave his firm did not breach his fiduciary duty by questioning other employees
about their desire, if any, to leave the firm and work for his new firm in the future);
Nat'l Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 26-28 (Mo. 1966) (stating that employees
who organized, planned and incorporated a new competing company while still em-
ployed did not breach their fiduciary duties).
16 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (2006). See Television Events & Mktg.,
Inc. v. Amcon Distrib. Co., 526 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1133-34 (D. Haw. 2007).
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.07 (2006). "An agent has a duty to act in
accordance with the express and implied terms of any contract between the agent and
the principal." Id. See Hendricks Prop. Mgmt. Corp. v. Birchwood Props. Ltd. P'ship, 741
N.W.2d 461, 465-66 (N.D. 2007).
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the care, competence and diligence exercised by employees simi-
larly situated.19 The employee must act reasonably and avoid
actions likely to damage the employer 20 and must act only with-
in the scope of the employee's actual authority.21 The employee
has the duty to provide information material to the employment
and its functions.22 Duties of performance relate objectively to
each employee's specific obligations and provide standards spe-
cific to that particular employment relationship. For example,
although the overarching duties of performance are the same
whether the employee is an entry-level stock clerk, a mid-level
I RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09(2) (2006). "An agent has a duty to comp-
ly with all lawful instructions received from the principal and persons designated by the
principal concerning the agent's actions on behalf of the principal." Id. See Appleby v.
Kewanee Oil Co., 279 F.2d 334, (10th Cir. 1960) (reaffirming that an agent must obey
any lawful instructions given by the principal).
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006).
Subject to any agreement with the principal, an agent has a duty to the prin-
cipal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by
agents in similar circumstances. Special skills or knowledge possessed by an
agent are circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the
agent acted with due care and diligence. If an agent claims to possess special
skills or knowledge, the agent has a duty to the principal to act with the care,
competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents with such skills or
knowledge.
Id. See Carrier v. McLlarky, 693 A.2d 76, 78 (N.H. 1997) ("Agents have a duty to conduct
the affairs of the principal with a certain level of diligence, skill, and competence.").
20 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.10 (2006). "An agent has a duty, within the
scope of the agency relationship, to act reasonably and to refrain from conduct that is
likely to damage the principal's enterprise." Id. See McGarry v. Saint Anthony of Padua
Roman Catholic Church, 704 A.2d 1353, 1357-58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (stat-
ing that even if an agent's actions are satisfactory, an agent's conduct that sheds impro-
per light or can damage the principal breaches an agent's fiduciary duty).
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09(1) (2006). "An agent has a duty to take
action only within the scope of the agent's actual authority." Id. See Baranksi v. Fifteen
Unknown Agents of ATF, 195 F. Supp. 2d 862, 866 (W.D. Ky. 2002) (noting that execut-
ing and serving search warrants is within the scope of duty for ATF agents).
22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (2006).
An agent has a duty to use reasonable effort to provide the principal with facts
that the agents knows, has reason to know, or should know when
(1) subject to any manifestation by the principal, the agent knows or has
reason to know that the principal would wish to have the facts or the facts
are material to the agent's duties to the principal; and
(2) the facts can be provided to the principal without violating a superior
duty owed by the agent to another person.
Id. See United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459, 461-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Sotheby's
Int'l Realty, Inc. v. Black, 472 F. Supp. 2d 481, 486-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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sales manager, or an upper-level executive vice president, it is
easy to distinguish among the requirements which would satisfy
the fulfillment of such duties at each level, and it is obvious that
the requirements become more onerous as the levels of employ-
ment rise. 23 This is not so easily distinguishable or obvious
when one looks at employees' fiduciary duties of loyalty that
serve functions distinct from those of performance. 24 Nonethe-
less, disloyalty by employees is likely to fall into two basic cate-
gories: the first stemming from a conflict between the employ-
er's interests and those of the employee, and the second stem-
ming from conflicting interests from multiple or successive em-
ployers.25 The majority of cases involving alleged breaches of the
duty of loyalty by employees fall into the first category due to
the sheer fact that most employees will be acting for only one
employer 2 6 -unlike other non-employee agents who more often
work for multiple principals. Of course, as the American work-
force becomes more mobile, and this mobility is likely to grow
during today's recessionary times, the amount of breaches of
employee loyalty arising from conflicting interests from multiple
employers will most certainly increase.27 Moreover, the reach of
23 Interestingly, although at-will employment does not bind an employee to perfor-
mance, the duty of loyalty has been found to attach once performance begins. See Con-
don Auto Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Crick, 604 N.W.2d 587, 599 (Iowa 1999).
24 DeMott, supra note 3, at 1057-58 (generalizing that the duty of loyalty acts as
"an exclusively subsidiary function" in that, regardless of the agent's completion of other
duties, the agent's actions can still be scrutinized as to their loyalty throughout the
process of completing those duties). See Bee Load Ltd. v. British Broad., No. CV03-417,
2005 WL 3338923, at *2 (Me. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2005) (noting that "the duty of loyalty
and the duty of care are distinct elements found in a fiduciary relationship"); Meyers v.
Sudfeld, No. Civ. A.05-2970, 2006 WL 401855, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006) (stating
that "a claim of breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty represents a distinct cause of
action ... which implicates a duty of care").
25 DeMott, supra note 3, at 1054 (citing Matthew Conaglen, The Nature and Func-
tion of Fiduciary Loyalty, 121 L.Q.R. 452, 465 (2005)).
26 Fatland v. Quaker State Corp., 62 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 1995).
27 See generally Jill Rubery, Jill Earnshaw & Mick Marchmgton, Blurring the
Boundaries to the Employment Relationship: From Single to Multi-Employer Relation-
ships, in FRAGMENTING WORK: BLURRING ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND
DISORDERING HIERARCHIES at 64 (Mick Marchington et al. eds., Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2005) ("Where employees of one organization work in environments open to
pressure and influence from other employers, the relevance of key notions of... loyalty.
. .are called into question."). See also Alfred W. Blumrosen & Ruth G. Blumrosen, First
Statistical Report on Intentional Job Discrimination Against Women, 25 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 63, 69 (2003) ("[I]n the present era, where job security is no longer so common
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the duty encompasses any employee conduct that is inconsistent
with the employer's interests and, therefore, it arguably extends
to harmful speech,28 insubordination, 29 neglect, 30 disruption of
employee/employer relations,31 or discrediting the employer's
name,32 product 33 or reputation.
34
Courts sometimes indicate that the employee accused of
breaching his or her fiduciary duties was an officer, executive,
or manager and the use of such facts would seem to attach some
and employee "loyalty" has been undermined by changes in the employment relation-
ship, an increasing proportion of employees are likely to be mobile."). But see, Yuval
Feldman, Experimental Approach to the Study of Normative Failures: Divulging of
Trade Secrets by Silicon Valley Employees, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POLY. 105, 119
(2003) (positing employers in the Silicon Valley accept employee disclosure of trade
secrets and do not sue former employers because the employers remember how they
began their own careers).
28 When one is fired because of information appearing on one's website or in a blog,
the employee has been "dooced." Laura DiBiase, To Blog or Not to Blog?, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Nov. 24, 2005, at 32. Some states have enacted legislation making it harder for
employees to be terminated for off-duty conduct. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-
402.5 (West 1990) (prohibiting an employer from terminating "any employee due to that
employee's engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during non-
working hours"); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2)(c) (McKinney 2003) (prohibiting employer
discipline or termination for an employee's "legal recreational activities outside work
hours"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2005) (prohibiting discrimination based on an
employee's lawful off-duty activities). See Aaron Kirkland, "You Got Fired? On Your Day
Off?!" Challenging Termination of Employees for Personal Blogging Practices, 75 UMKC
L. REV. 545 (2006) (calling for a federal approach to protect off-duty activities which are
unrelated to job performance).
29 Grigsby v. Kane, 250 F. Supp. 2d 453, 455 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (finding two former
attorneys for Pennsylvania's Bureau of Professional Licensing and Occupational Affairs
were properly terminated for speaking out against a new quota system used to deter-
mine "which healthcare professionals should be prosecuted for violating the law").
30 Long v. Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 907 N.E.2d 373, 381 (Ohio Ct. App.
2009) (stating that standards of employee conduct for employees of the Dep't are vi-
olated by "incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct, insu-
bordination, discourteous treatment of public, neglect of duty, acts of misfeasance or
nonfeasance").
31 See generally Alberti v. County of Nassau, 393 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(finding an employee's political affiliation may lead to disruption of employee/employer
relations when the employment concerns policymaking and political connections).
32 Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding an employee can violate
his/her duty by discrediting the employer's name through posting messages on an inter-
net blog).
33 Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1997) (finding an air-
line employee violated a duty not to discredit an employer's product by sending a letter
to a newspaper criticizing the airline).
34 Tory A. Weigand, Employee Duty of Loyalty and the Doctrine of Forfeiture, 42
BOSTON BAR J. 6, 7 (Sept./Oct. 1998).
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importance to the level of an employee's position when adjudi-
cating fiduciary duties.35 For example, when applying Illinois
law, a federal district court pointed to the fact that the employee
was highly paid, had access to the employer's confidential in-
formation such as customer lists, and had authority to place
orders and sell and distribute products before concluding that
the employee was liable for a breach of a fiduciary duty.36 Con-
versely, the court in Dalton v. Camp 37 did not discuss whether a
former manager owed the fiduciary duties of an agent to his
employer and whether the alleged conduct formed a basis for a
breach of fiduciary duties.38 Instead, the court implicitly estab-
lished the presumption that a fiduciary relationship does not
exist between employer and employee. 39 The court further clari-
fied that it did not sanction an independent action for breach of
duty of loyalty and stated that the manager's disloyalty was on-
ly relevant as part of the employer's defense in an action for
wrongful termination.
40
35 E.g., Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, 717 A. 2d 724, 730 (Conn.
1998) (holding that, unlike the firm's partner, the junior associate did not have the spe-
cial trust with the client to conclude that there is a fiduciary duty); Sun Life Assurance
Co. of Can. v. Coury, 838 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Pride Mobility Prods. Corp. v.
Dylewski, No. 3:08-cv-0231, 2009 WL 249356, at *18 (M.D. Pa. 2009) ("[D]efendants
were shareholders, employees, directors, and managers of the plaintiff corporation and
clearly owed the plaintiff corporation the fiduciary duties commensurate with their
respective positions."); ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions &
Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 716 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that the district court improperly
granted summary judgment to employee defendants solely because it did not need to
consider the employees' "alleged positions of trust and access to confidential informa-
tion" on the grounds that salespeople cannot owe fiduciary duties to an employer); Ta-
lenburst, Inc. v. Collabera, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265-67 (D. Mass. 2008) (stating
that Massachusetts law of employee-employer fiduciary duties depends on an evaluation
of the whether the employee held "positions of trust and confidence"); c.f. Chelsea Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Gaffney, 449 N.E.2d 320, 326 (1983) (stating "Employees occupying a posi-
tion of trust and confidence owe a duty of loyalty to their employer and must protect the
interests of the employer.").
36 Diamond Blade Warehouse, Inc. v. Paramount Diamond Tools, Inc., 420 F. Supp
2d. 866, 871 (N.D. Ill. 2006). The court granted injunctive relief to an employer when a
former employee violated the restrictive covenants of his employment agreement and
breached his fiduciary duty by soliciting customers and other employees. Id.
37 548 S.E. 2d 704 (N.C. 2001).
3 See id. at 708; Bret L. Grebe, Fidelity at the Workplace: The Two-faced Nature of
the Duty of Loyalty under Dalton v. Camp, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1815, 1826 (2002).
39 Bret L. Grebe, supra note 38, at 1821.
40 Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at 709. The former employee had responsibilities "not unlike
those of employees in other businesses and can hardly be construed as uniquely posi-
EMPLOYEE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
To the extent that the holding in Food Lion, Inc.... can be
read to sanction an independent action . . .we conclude that
the federal district court incorrectly interpreted our state case
law .... [A]n examination of our state's case law fails to reveal
support for the . . .contention that this Court would broaden
the scope of fiduciary duty to include food-counter clerks em-
ployed by a grocery store chain.
41
Rather than obliquely relying on facts that show any em-
ployee being charged with fiduciary duties is in actuality an of-
ficer of the employer or implicitly establishing a presumption
against the fiduciary status of lower-level employees, a much
more direct approach would be advisable. Direct development of
the law in this manner would not only provide clarity and a
more rational analytical approach, but it would also provide bet-
ter guidance to employers, employees, and those providing ad-
vice to them concerning the fiduciary obligations of all levels of
employees.
This direct approach is apparent in Wisconsin common law.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin established an initial thre-
shold to be met when the claim is for an employee's breach of
the duty of loyalty.42 The threshold question is whether the em-
ployee has an agency relationship;43 if the employee is a "key
employee" then the duty of loyalty is present." The determina-
tion of whether one is a key employee depends on the nature of
the employment duties.45 In this particular case, the court
looked to the fact that the employee was the "Procure-
tioning him to exercise dominion." Id. Accord Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Goel, 555
S.E.2d 281 (N.C. App. 2001).
41 Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at 709. The federal district court held a cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty had been stated against supermarket employers who were
actually television reporters who did not disclose their true identities in securing em-
ployment and later disclosed food mishandling via videotaping in the workplace. Food
Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1224 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
42 Burbank Grease Servs., L.L.C. v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2006).
43 Burg v. Miniature Precision Components, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 192 (Wis. 1983).
44 Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 303-04 (citing Burg v. Minature Precision Components,
Inc. 330 N.W.2d 192 (Wis. 1983); Aon Risk Servs., Inc. v. Liebenstein, 710 N.W.2d 175
(2006)). See also Marshfield Machine Corp. v. Martin, 630 N.W.2d 275 (Wis. Ct. App.
2001); Modern Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Tooling Specialists, Inc., 557 N.W.2d 835,
838 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
45 Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 796 (citing Aon, 710 N.W.2d at 175).
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ment/Territory manager" and stood in a confidential relation-
ship regarding trade secrets and other confidential data pro-
vided to him in this particular management position. 46 The de-
tails of the employee's responsibilities gave rise to the fiduciary
duties of an agent and created the duty of loyalty and the duty
not to disclose information material to the agency relationship.
47
Canadian employment law recognizes that while all employees
owe a basic contractual duty of loyalty to their employers, only
certain employees, based upon their duties and responsibilities,
owe the more exacting fiduciary duties to employers.
48
Only a few states statutorily define the agency relationship,
one of which is the State of Georgia. 49 Georgia statutes define
the agency relationship as arising "wherever one person, ex-
pressly or by implication, authorizes another to act for him or
subsequently ratifies the acts of another in his behalf."50 In ad-
dition, Georgia courts have held that an employer-employee re-
lationship does not typically create an agency relationship un-
less the employee is vested with authority to act on behalf of the
employer.51 Fiduciary obligations such as a duty of loyalty do
not extend to low level employees in Georgia.
5 2
The scope of the duty of loyalty an employee owes to an em-
ployer in New Jersey varies with the nature of their relation-
ship. 53 Employees performing low-level tasks owe a lesser duty
than those occupying a position of trust and confidence. 54 In
46 Id. at 797.
47 Id. at 797-98.
48 James C. Oakley, Employee Duty of Loyalty -- A Canadian Perspective, 20 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 185, 190 (1999).
49 ALA. CODE § 8-2-1 (2008); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2307 (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. §
10-6-1 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-10-201 (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 3-01-06 (2008);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 59-2-2 (2008).
50 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6-1 (2008).
51 See Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 503 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1998); see also
Physician Specialists in Anesthesia, P.C. v. Wildmon, 521 S.E.2d 358, 360 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999).
52 See Se. Consultants, Inc. v. McCrary Eng'g Corp., 273 S.E.2d 112 (Ga. 1980). See
Physician Specialists in Anesthesia, 521 S.E.2d at 360-61 (noting that an employee does
not have fiduciary duties when the agency relationship simply involves an employee
who has no authority to create obligations on behalf of the employer and no right or
access to confidential and corporate records).
53 Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d 783, 789 (N.J. 1999).
- Id. The court cogently explained:
[VOL.79:4
EMPLOYEE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke,55 a salaried employee, while still em-
ployed, established a business to supplement his income without
disclosing this to his employer. 56 The court found the employee's
fiduciary duty may have been breached even though the sup-
plemental business did not directly compete with the employer's
business simply because the new business may have assisted
the employer's competitors. 57 The court remanded for a finding
as to whether the specific conduct did amount to a breach of du-
ty of loyalty.58 The court did advise that the "egregiousness of
the employee's conduct may affect the determination of' wheth-
er a breach had occurred and indicated the facts surrounding
the employment itself also shaped the outcome:
59
Facts suggesting that [the employee] did not breach his duty of
loyalty are that he was a low- or mid-level salaried employee;
that during his employment, [he] was not subject to any con-
tractual limitation preventing him from establishing an out-
side business; that he did not cause [the employer] to lose any
customers, sales, potential sales, or profits; and that he did not
compete directly with [the employer] or render substantial as-
sistance to any of its competitors. 60
A reality of contemporary life is that many families will consist of two wage
earners, one wage earner with two jobs, or both. For some employees, particu-
larly those earning low or modest incomes, second sources of income are an
economic necessity. For them, a second job or "moonlighting" is the only way to
make ends meet. Conversely, employers need the assurance that employees
will not disserve them by furthering their own interests or those of competitors
at the employers' expense.
Id.
55 Id.
s6 Id. at 786-87.
57 Id. at 788. The trial court, however, had dismissed the employer's complaint and
found the employer's testimony was "exaggerated" and vindictive, and concluded that
the employee's actions were not detrimental to the employer, the employee's new busi-
ness did not compete directly with the employer, and the employer had not suffered any
damages. Id. at 787.
58 Id. at 792.
59 Id. at 789.
60 Id. at 792. The court further opined that the fact finder could also determine that
the employee's assistance to any competitor was so insubstantial or that any competi-
tion between the alleged competitors and the employer was so insubstantial that the
employer did not breach any duty. Id.
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A somewhat similar approach to the threshold has devel-
oped in other jurisdictions. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
interpreted Texas law to mean that agency relationships, and
the fiduciary duties that attach, are not automatically assumed
merely based on an employee-employer relationship. 61 Instead,
the court looked at the particular facts of the employment cir-
cumstances and used them in analyzing whether an agency re-
lationship had been created. 62 While courts frequently state an
employee owes his or her employer a fiduciary duty, some courts
will not recognize an independent claim for a breach of a duty of
loyalty unless there is an underlying fiduciary relationship
beyond a mere employment situation. 63 When the employee in
Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd.64 sued his former employer for
fraud and breach of contract, the former employer counter-
claimed alleging breach of employment contract, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, and breach of the duty of loyalty.65 The trial court
granted the employee's motion for a judgment as a matter of law
on the counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty because no spe-
cial relationship of trust and confidence existed between the
employee and the employer. 66 The issues of breach of contract
and breach of the duty of loyalty did go to the jury with the jury
finding for the employee as to breach of contract, but granting
the former employer's counterclaim damages due to the em-
ployee's breach of the duty of loyalty.67 The appellate court,
however, found that the trial court had erred because the facts
61 Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2007).
62 Id. at 1207-09.
6 Compare Graphic Directions, Inc. v. Bush, 862 P.2d 1020 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993)
(stating that fiduciary duties extend to more than corporate officers and high level em-
ployees) and Cenla Physical Therapy & Rehab. Agency, Inc. v. Lavergne, 657 So.2d 175,
176-77 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that even "minor-role-playing employees" owe fidu-
ciary duties to employers) with Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Shatz, 717 A.2d
724, 729 (Conn. 1998) and Eaton Corp. v. Giere, 971 F.2d 136, 141 (8th Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that a cause of action for breach of the duty of loyalty is encompassed in a claim for a
breach of fiduciary duty).
- 498 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2007).
6 Id. at 1205-06.
66 Id. at 1208.
67 Id. At trial, the employee had requested $564,993 in damages and the jury
awarded him $444,933 while the former employer requested $143,000 on its counter-
claim for breach of duty of loyalty and the jury awarded $71,500 on the counterclaim. Id.
at 1206.
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of this employment not only gave rise to an agency relationship
but also that the undisputed evidence showed the employee had
breached the fiduciary duty.68 In applying Texas law, the court
recognized that employees are not necessarily agents with ac-
companying fiduciary duties and opined that fiduciary duties,
while imposed on some business relationships because of "spe-
cial trust,"69 are not part of "every relationship involving a high
degree of trust and confidence." 70 In determining as a matter of
law that a fiduciary relationship, and therefore fiduciary duties,
did indeed exist in this case, the court examined the employee's
specific duties.71 The employee had the ability to negotiate con-
tracts with authority over subcontracts and he had a written
employment contract in which he not only agreed to perform the
duties of an agent, but also consented to devote "full work time
and efforts to the business and affairs" of his employer. 72 Since
these duties rose to the level of a "special trust," the court held
that the employee had breached his fiduciary duty by failing to
68 Id. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for a jury determination of the
damages on the breach of fiduciary duty claim and for a judicial determination of the
remedy of forfeiture. Id. at 1215-16.
69 Id. at 1207 (citing Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex.
2002)).
70 Id. at 1207 (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176-77
(Tex. 1997)). Texas courts consider it "impossible to give a definition of the term" fidu-
ciary duties in a way "comprehensive enough to cover all cases." Johnson, 73. S.W.3d at
199.
71 Rash, 498 F.3d at 1208. The court pointed to three other cases where Texas courts
have found employees to be agents and fiduciaries. Id. (citing Johnson, 73 S.W.3d at
202-03 (holding that a law firm's associate had a fiduciary duty when the associate
"specifically undertook to act as [an] agent in obtaining an agreement" to represent
helicopter crash victims); Kinzbach Tool Co., v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160 S.W.2d 509,
513 (Tex. 1942) (holding that a fiduciary duty existed where an employee "permitted his
employer to consummate a contract wherea it bought for $25,000 that which he ...
knew might be bought for $20,000," failed to disclose this fact to his employer, and did
not disclose "that he was acting for the opposite side in the deal for a profit to himself');
Daniel v. Falcon Interest Realty Corp., 190 S.W.3d 177, 185-87 (Tex. App. 2005) (hold-
ing that a fiduciary duty existed when the employee was "hired to serve as a project
manager and on-site superintendent for the project" whose specific responsibilities in-
cluded "soliciting bids, setting the scope of work for each subcontractor, reviewing the
bids, letting the contracts, and overseeing people working on the project")).
72 Rash, 498 F.3d at 1208-09. The employee had sole management responsibilities
of a branch; he was charged with finding facilities to operate the business, hiring and
training employees, gathering tools and equipment, promoting the venture, soliciting
and receiving bids, and their invoices, setting customer rates, and tracking all costs. Id.
at 1208.
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disclose his interest in another company that competed and con-
tracted with the employer.
73
The court in Rash carefully segregated an employee's
"common law" duty of loyalty from an agent's fiduciary duty and
stated:
[T]he fiduciary relationship establishes a distinct and separate
obligation than the duty of loyalty to an employer described
above. The fiduciary duty exists because of the "peculiar" trust
between the employee-agent and his employer-principal....
Thus, the bonds created by a fiduciary relationship are strong-
er and the obligations are correspondingly more rigorous than
those ascribed to the duty of loyalty.
74
Not only did the court distinguish between the duty of loyalty,
which every employee owes to her employer, and the fiduciary
duty owed by an agent, but the court also stated that an agent's
fiduciary duty may be "more wide-ranging" and the employee's
actions could constitute a "more egregious violation under a fi-
duciary theory than under a loyalty theory."
75
It is when we look to the damages to be applied to a particu-
lar case that these distinctions become critical. For a breach of
the duty of loyalty, typically an employer has the option of reco-
vering either the profit earned by the disloyal employee or the
profit the employer would have earned had the employee not
been disloyal.76 The remedy of disgorgement 77 is not only to
compensate for the wrong but to act as a disincentive to prevent
such wrongs from occurring. 78 The concepts of restitution and
73 Id. at 1209-11.
74 Id. at 1211.
75 Id. Since the employer had argued the breach of fiduciary duty claim was an
alternative, not a supplement, to the duty of loyalty claim, the court held that a jury
determination on the damages for breach of fiduciary duty would have to be offset by the
previously awarded amount on the breach of duty of loyalty claim. Id. at 1212.
76 See Gomez v. Bicknell, 756 N.Y.S.2d 209, 214 (2002).
77 See generally Daniel v. Falcon Interest Realty Corp., 190 S.W.3d 177, 186-87 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2005).
78 Gomez, 756 N.Y.S.2d at 113-14 (citing Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910,
912 (N.Y. 1969)). See Millbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2d
Cir. 1994) (stating that a principal could recover for breach of fiduciary duty without
proving "but for" causation or proximate cause).
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unjust enrichment 79 also support the legal basis for liability80
even though the employer is not able to establish that the em-
ployee's breach of the duty of loyalty caused a loss to the em-
ployer.81 Some courts, however, require a strict causal connec-
tion between the breach of fiduciary duty and the amount of
damages claimed.
8 2
When a strict causal connection is required, or when a dis-
loyal employee has not realized any gain, or when it is difficult
to prove that any harm to a principal resulted from such dis-
loyalty, forfeiture may be the remedy utilized by a court.8 3 For-
feiture not only has a valuable deterrent effect because it sig-
nals that some adverse consequences will inure to any disloyal
employee,8 4 but it also enables the employer to have a remedy at
a much lower cost than protracted litigation:8
5
Forfeiture is based on two propositions: (1) the principal is
considered not to have received what he bargained for if the
agent breaches his fiduciary duties while representing the
principal, and (2) fee forfeiture is designed to discourage
agents from being disloyal to their principal or "to protect rela-
tionships of trust by discouraging agents' disloyalty." The re-
79 See generally VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 641 A.2d 519, 526 (N.J. 1994)
(defining the concepts of restitution and unjust enrichment).
80 "[A] plaintiff suing for breach of fiduciary duty can recover damages for mental
anguish" in some jurisdictions. Justice Terry Jennings, Fiduciary Litigation in Texas, 69
TEX. B.J. 844, 848 (2006) (citing Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 266-67 (Tex.
App. 1991)).
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d(1) (2006).
82 Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 631 N.E.2d. 995, 999 (Mass. 1994).
83 Katalinic v. Bd. of Trustees of Mun. Employees', Officers', & Officials' Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 898 N.E.2d 243, 248 (Ill. App. 1st 2008) (stating that forfeiture is suffi-
cient so long as there is a causal connection with the employment); Musico v. Champion
Credit Corp., 764 F.2d 102, 113 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting the trend in New York law is
toward the Restatement position of apportioning forfeitures of a disloyal agent's com-
pensation in specified circumstances).
84 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (THIRD) § 8.01 cmt. d(2) (2006).
85 Id. Employers can also pursue appropriate remedies against employees for mi-
sappropriation of trade secrets, but proving such has been so difficult, expensive and
unpredictable that employers have found it prohibitive to use except in extreme cases.
Yuval Feldman, Experimental Approach to the Study of Normative Failures: Divulging
of Trade Secrets by Silicon Valley Employees, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y. 105, 117-
18 (2003).
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medy of forfeiture "applies generally in agency relation-
ships."
86
The facts of the employment relationship and the extent of
the employee's actions should affect the applicability and the
extent of any forfeiture. 7 Forfeiture is generally an equitable
remedy, comparable to a constructive trust.88 Generally, a for-
mer employee may be required to repay all compensation8 9 re-
ceived during the period of her disloyalty. 90 Some states do not
permit set-off for properly performed services during the period
of disloyalty,91 while others limit forfeiture or apportion fees
86 Rash v. J. V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F.3d 1201, 1212 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Burrow v. Acre, 997 S.W.2d 229, 237-38, 242-43 (Tex. 1999)) (citations omitted).
87 Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 518 S.E.2d 591, 596-97 (S.C.
1999) (stating that in assessing compensation in forfeiture, "the nature of the employ-
ment relationship, the nature and extent of the employee's services and the breach of
duty, the loss or expense caused to the employer by the breach of duty, and the value to
the employer of the services properly rendered by the employee" should be taken into
consideration). See also Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer, 289 N.W.2d 280, 287 (Wis.
1980) (stating that the court must focus on the particular circumstances of a case rather
than adopting a rigid rule requiring forfeiture of all compensation during disloyalty); Jet
Courier Serv. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486, 497 (Colo. 1989) (stating that the court should
consider the nature of the employment relationship, the impact or potential impact of
the employee's actions on the employer's operations, and the benefit received by the
employer during the period of disloyalty).
88 Justice Terry Jennings, Fiduciary Litigation in Texas, 69 TEX. B.J. 844, 848
(2006) (citing Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. 1999)).
89 See Foley v. Am. Elec. Power, 425 F. Supp. 2d 863, 875-76 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (de-
ferring that compensation plan benefits constitute forfeitable employee compensation);
Phansaalkar v. Anderson Weinroth & Co., L.P., 344 F.3d 184, 210-11 (2d Cir. 2003)
(stating that employer offered investment opportunity and its realized benefits are sub-
ject to forfeiture by a disloyal employee).
90 G.K. Alan Assoc., Inc. v. Lazazari, 840 N.Y.S.2d 378, 384-85 (App. Div. 2007)
(noting that federal courts typically hold forfeiture to only compensation due in relation
to the disloyal action or actions); Ulico Cas. Co. v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman &
Dicker, 865 N.Y.S.2d 14, 23-24 (App. Div. 2008) (stating that in terms of attorney dis-
loyalty in the attorney-client relationship, a separate hearing is required to fully estab-
lish disloyalty for forfeiture purposes); Aramony v. United Way Replacement Benefit
Plan, 191 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that under New York law employees are
obliged to forfeit salary during the period of disloyalty).
91 Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486, 505 (Colo. 1989) (Mullarkey, J.,
concurring) ("Set-offs against wage claims are disfavored because of the inherent eco-
nomic inequity between the employer and employee."); ABC Trans Nat'l Transp., Inc. v.
Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 1299, 1315 (111. App. 1980) (stating that while
forfeiture is proper during periods of disloyalty, "[t]he agent retains compensation
rightfully earned before the breach, for specific periods").
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under certain conditions.92 Complete forfeiture is imposed in
Massachusetts unless the disloyal conduct is not egregious and
the employee has established that his services were valuable
beyond the parameters of his disloyal conduct, 93 yet little atten-
tion actually has been paid to the egregiousness factor by the
courts. 94 Instead, the baseline proposition has remained one of
complete forfeiture by a disloyal employee. 95 The approach to
forfeiture in New Jersey, however, is somewhat different. 96 The
court in Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke outlined four considerations
that would affect whether forfeiture was an appropriate remedy
for breach of an employee's duty.97 First, the court looked at the
existence of contractual provisions, and whether such provisions
permitted or specifically prohibited certain behavior. 98 Second,
the court determined whether the employer knew of or agreed to
the employee's conduct, with the court allotting specific interest
to any employee disclosures to the employer. 99 Third, the court
examined the status of the employee and her relationship to the
employer. 100 Finally, the court looked at the nature of the em-
ployee's second source of income.101 The usefulness of these four
considerations is somewhat undercut by the court's recognition
that the guidelines require reference to specific facts, which, due
92 Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 148-49 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying a rule of
apportionment under New York law to the fees related to the specific items of work for
which the agent had acted disloyally); Bessman v. Bessman, 520 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Kan.
1974) (stating that a minor breach affecting a single transaction will not result in forfei-
ture of the compensation attributable to other transactions).
93 Tory A. Weigand, Employee Duty of Loyalty and the Doctrine of Forfeiture, 42
BOSTON B.J., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 6, 7.
94 Id. at 21-22 (citing Boston Children's Heart Found., Inc. v. Nadal-Ginard, 73 F.3d
429, 435 (1st Cir. 1996)).
95 Id.
9 See, e.g., Simulations Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Oldham, 634 A.2d 1034 (N.J. App. 1993);
Joseph Toker, Inc. v. Cohen, 169 A.2d 838 (N.J. App. 1961).
97 Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d 783, 791 (N.J. 1999). The court looked to
whether the employee's conduct was "willful and deliberate" as well as the "egregious-
ness" of the actions. Id.
98 Id.
9 Id
100 Id. This third consideration would appear to mirror the analysis concerning
whether a fiduciary relationship even existed to justify the application of any doctrine of
forfeiture. "An officer, director, or key executive, for example, has a higher duty than an
employee working on a production line." Id.
101 Id. at 791.
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to an inadequate record, were lacking in this particular case. 10 2
While the court in Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd. did not list
similar considerations for the applicability of the remedy of for-
feiture, it did state that forfeiture was a proper equitable reme-
dy that applied only to clear and serious violations of fiduciary
duties and thus remanded for a judicial determination of the
propriety of the remedy of forfeiture. 10 3 Before this judicial de-
termination could be made, the court, upon remand, submitted
fact questions to the jury concerning the timing of the em-
ployee's breach of fiduciary duty, the willfulness of the em-
ployee's acts, and the damages caused thereby. 10 4 Because of
this, it appears as though the court believes these facts will de-
termine if the violations were clear and serious.
A disjunction would seem to occur between the agency con-
cept making the employment relationship one of agency and the
fiduciary duties and the remedies for breach of those duties as
applied to lower-level employees. At best, applying the lens of
agency law to all employment situations requires most jurisdic-
tions to engage in an overlapping analysis in first trying to de-
cide if the specific facts give rise to a breach of fiduciary duty by
an employee, and then again when adjudicating the appropriate
remedy. An officer or an employee who possesses significant
discretion and authority in her position should have higher du-
ties of loyalty imposed by law than those of the lower-level em-
ployee. The law of agency would appear to be best situated to
properly define these distinctions. While the concept of a broad
duty of loyalty owed to every employer is an enticing one, if an
employer is uniquely vulnerable to an employee who holds dis-
cretion or authority, the employer has it within its power to take
102 Id. at 792. John A. Boyle, Moonlighting-Employee Assistance to an Employer's
Competitor, Including Formation of a Competing Business, May Breach the Employee's
Duty of Loyalty and Require Forfeiture of Compensation Paid to the Employee During
Periods of Disloyalty, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 673, 681 (2000).
103 Rash v. J. V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F.3d 1201, 1212, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003). Upon
remand, the jury's involvement in the equitable remedy of forfeiture is limited to resolv-
ing contested fact issues. See Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd., No. 04-CV-681-FHM, 2008
WL 2568305, at *1 (N.D. Okla. June 20, 2008).
104 Rash, 498 F.3d at 1212, 1216.
[VOL.79:4
EMPLO YEE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
additional measures for adequate protection. 105 The lower-level
employee, however, has no such ability to insulate himself from
the overbroad application of fiduciary duties. The sweeping ca-
tegorization of every employee as an agent without permitting
distinctions for those employees who are not "key"'10 6 or who do
not hold a position of "special trust"'07 creates the very real pos-
sibility that low-level employees may suffer from the harsh for-
feiture remedies without any allowance made for work per-
formed during a period outside of the perceived breach. While
total forfeiture may make sense as a punitive or deterrent
measure in the case of an officer or confidential employee, it un-
fairly tips the scale in favor of the employer when it over broad-
ly includes all employees. The concept of employee fiduciary du-
ties should be more carefully defined and not just applied to all.
105 Employers should seek protections as part of an employment contract, confiden-
tiality agreement, trade secrets, and the like. Both employer and employee would be on
notice as to the terms and have an opportunity for a bargained for exchange.
106 Burbank Grease Serv., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d. 781, 796 (Wis. 2006).
107 Rash, 498 F.3d at 1207.
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